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Fig. 1. The DEOS change accommodation cycle
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Abstract—We describe how a security informed analysis of 
the open systems dependability model of DEOS can be used to 
frame the problem of open systems and security. Together with 
an approach for analysing industry objectives based on claims, 
arguments and evidence (CAE), we develop a set of principles 
and rationale for the security and safety of road transport 
systems. The associated CAE will provide a generic template for 
a security informed safety case and supports standardization 
activities for security-informed safety. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper and associated talk, we describe how the open 
systems dependability model of DEOS can be used to frame 
the problem of open systems and security. Together with a 
framework for analysing decision based on claims, arguments 
and evidence (CAE), we are developing principles for security 
and safety for an automotive standard. 
II. FRAMING THE PROBLEM
Open systems dependability is the ability to accommodate 
changes in purpose, objectives, environment and actual 
performance and to achieve accountability continually, so as to 
provide expected services as and when required. 
The DEOS process provides a reference model for an open 
system. It consists of two cycles: 
• Change Accommodation Cycle to adapt system
according to requirement changes;
• Failure Response Cycle to provide failure prevention,
failure response and analyse the causes of failures.
We use a CAE framework for analysing engineering 
decision, particularly those concerned with dependability but 
also wider issues such as regulatory strategy [1]. We can assess 
the role for the different parts of the DEOS process (see Fig.2) 
[9] by examining their contribution to different claims and
arguments and evidence for a generic dependability claim. Fig.
2 shows how the CAE framework can be mapped to the DEOS
process (and vice versa).
A preliminary analysis will show that there will be two 
major changes from a security perspective. The adaptation 
process needs to consider non-benign events (see Fig. 3) and 
attacks on the change infrastructure. The change infrastructure 
will also need to be adapted in the fact of threats and other 
changes so the diagram and DEOS approach [9] will be 
deepened as it is applied recursively. In addition the 
requirements on the confidentiality of information need to be 
captured in an appropriate policy. The overall impact of 
security can be assessed by applying security informed Hazops, 
STRIDE or STPA to the DEOS process.  
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Fig. 2. Example of mapping claims to the DEOS process 
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Fig. 3. Process needs to consider non-benign events 
Sixth Workshop on Open Systems Dependability Tokyo, 2017-10-21
- 6 -
DEOS	Cycles D-ADD
Consensus	Building
Development
Accountability
Failure	Response
Cause	Analysis,	Responsive	
Action,	Failure	Prevention
Requirements	History
D-Case
Failures	&	Anomalies	Logs
D-Script	Code
D-RE
D-BoxD-System	Monitor D-Script	EngineD-App	Monitor
 
Fig. 4. Detailed data flow diagram in the DEOS framework 
To do this we need to create more detailed models of the 
dataflow within the reference DEOS architecture. This is 
shown in Fig. 4.  
In the traditional DEOS model the relationships on this 
diagram are trusted, so we can apply the standard security 
approach to analysing each of them. For example, we can use 
Microsoft’s STRIDE with six main threat categories: Spoofing, 
Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of 
service, and Elevation of privilege. An example is shown in 
Table 1. 
TABLE I.  ANALYSIS OF DATA FLOW FROM THE CONSENSUS BUILDING 
TO THE DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 
STRIDE keyword Analysis of Data flow from the Consensus Building to the Development block 
Spoofing 
Someone acting like a stakeholder (but not 
actually a stakeholder) sends a set of new 
requirements to the development. 
Tempering Requirements are modified during while being transferred to the development. 
(Non-) repudiation Developers claim to have not received any requirements for implementation. 
Information disclosure 
Leakage of requirements to a third party 
during the transfer process. This can be 
important as requirements can be 
confidential (e.g. encrypt all data with this 
type of key). 
Denial of service Requirements cannot be delivered because of the flooded channel. 
Elevation of privilege 
Someone gets access to a stakeholder’s 
account and sends requirements to the 
developers. 
This analysis will lead to more detailed recommendation 
for the implementation of the DEOS process and architecture. 
III. DEVELOPING PRINCIPLES 
Having used the open systems perspective to frame the 
problem we can relate these to the principles and guidance for 
use in standardisation. We can identify principles using a top 
down approach based on a vision for the industry that we 
systematically analyses in our CAE framework to derive 
objectives (see for example the work in [1] applying this to 
aviation regulation). We can use the DEOS perspective to 
check our approach for scope. We also undertake a more 
bottom up analysis by comparing and contrasting the principles 
from existing guidance on security, risk assessment, assurance 
and automotive applications.  
We have developed claims-evidence-argument approaches 
to reason and communicate about the trustworthiness of 
systems. In previous projects we have used them to support the 
development of policy and to assess the impact of security 
issues on safety regulation [1] To develop and justify the 
principles for the Guidance, we are constructing a claims-
evidence-argument case showing how the principles support a 
high-level vision for the industry.  
In this Section we provide an overview and some details of 
the evolving approach. 
We start with a proposed high level vision: “We see a 
world where everyone has confidence in a safe and secure road 
transport sector”. From this, we focus on the cyber-security 
related issues: “We see a world where there is justified 
confidence that cyber-security issues do not pose unacceptable 
risks to the safety and resilience of road transport...” 
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Fig. 5. CAE structure 
 
The complete CAE structure we are developing can be seen 
in Fig. 5 where we have identified the main areas of the 
principles. We will expand and develop further on this 
structure as the project develops. 
REVIEW AND MAPPING OF OTHER PRINCIPLES 
There is considerable work done on developing security 
principles. We have reviewed the following principles for 
security: 
• DfT/CCAV: The Key Principles of Cyber Security for 
Connected and Automated Vehicles [2] 
• NCSC: NIS Directive Guidance [3] 
• ONR: Security Assessment Principles [4] 
• NHTSA: Cybersecurity for Modern Vehicles [5] 
• Rail Industry Cyber Security Assurance Group: Cyber 
Security Assurance Principles [6] 
We have also documented the ENISA Good practices [7] 
and the draft IET “Safe and Secure” principles [8] as further 
useful sources of information. 
We have used the ASCE tool to map these principles and to 
show their interrelationships as shown in Fig. 6. This initial 
analysis identifies three broad categories of principles that all 
these documents address to a differing extent: 
1. Organisational security 
2. Product or project lifecycle 
3. Design principles (covering architecture through to 
component design) 
A detailed comparison of the principles is in progress. In 
addition we use of own experience of assessing the safety and 
security of systems, as well as consultation with industry and 
government, to develop a list of cross cutting themes for which 
we provide more detailed guidance tied into the different 
principles.  We currently envision topics such as the following: 
• Lifecycle processes 
• Risk assessment and hazard analysis 
• Composition of assurance cases 
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 Fig. 6. Overview of mapping of principles 
 CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
We have described how a security informed analysis of the 
open systems dependability model of DEOS can be used to 
frame the problem of open systems and security. Together with 
an approach for analysing objectives based on claims, 
arguments and evidence, we are developing a set of principles 
and rationale for the security and safety of road transport 
systems. The associated CAE will provide a generic template 
for a security informed safety case. This is currently work in 
progress but the intention is to publish in late 2018 the output 
of this work to support a new standard for the industry. 
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